Device security
Can an iPhone be hacked without a click? How to protect your iPhone and Mac
Published 10 min readYes. On a vulnerable iPhone, even when it is locked and idle, a message can trigger an attack before the recipient reads it. In 2023, Citizen Lab found Pegasus on an iPhone that was fully up to date at the time. Lockdown Mode blocked the exploit chain involved. A separate documented case on Mac involved receiving AirPlay content.
In 30 seconds
- Install security updates on every device. Locking the screen does not stop incoming messages.
- If your work puts you at risk of being targeted, turn on Lockdown Mode before an attack. It limits attachments and some calls and web content.
- If Apple alerts you, verify the notification in your account from a trusted device and get specialist help before wiping the device.

Lockdown Mode limits what the device processes automatically
An incoming message has to be decoded before it can be displayed. By rejecting certain attachments, the iPhone avoids running the code that would interpret them. This helps protect people targeted by spyware, even if they already take care to avoid suspicious links. [1]
| Feature | What Lockdown Mode restricts | What still works |
|---|---|---|
| Messages | Most attachments, links and link previews are blocked. | Text and some image, audio and video files can still get through. |
| FaceTime | Incoming calls are filtered. SharePlay and Live Photos are unavailable. | Someone you have called in the past 30 days can call you back. Regular and emergency phone calls remain available. |
| Web | The browser limits some advanced features. A website you rely on for work may slow down or lose functionality. | You can still browse. Adding an exception for a trusted site relaxes the protection for that site. |
| Accessories and networks | You need to unlock the iPhone to connect a wired accessory. The iPhone avoids joining unsecured Wi-Fi automatically and disables 2G and 3G. | An accessory can connect once you unlock the device. Supported mobile networks remain usable. |
| Sharing and device management | Location information is removed from shared photos. Shared Albums, new device management enrolments and manual profile installations are restricted. | A device enrolled before you turn on Lockdown Mode stays under its administrator’s management. |
In practice. Go to Settings → Privacy & Security → Lockdown Mode, turn it on and let the iPhone restart. Then check the apps you rely on. To protect a compatible Mac as well, enable the mode on the Mac separately. [1]
Pegasus: from malicious links to zero-click attacks
Pegasus is spyware made by NSO Group. Trident, FORCEDENTRY and BLASTPASS are three exploit chains used to install it. One way to see the difference is to ask what the target had to do.
2016 · Trident required a click
Human rights defender Ahmed Mansoor forwarded a text message promising revelations to Citizen Lab. Working with Lookout, researchers established that the link exploited three vulnerabilities to install Pegasus. Mansoor received a targeted attempt and did not open the link. [2]
2021 · FORCEDENTRY struck before the message was read
On a Saudi activist’s iPhone infected with Pegasus, Citizen Lab found iMessage attachments named “.gif”. Some of them actually contained a PDF. [3]
Simply decoding the image let iOS execute code. The recipient did not have to open anything.
For technical readers · The decoder and the fix
The PDF contained a JBIG2-compressed image. Apple fixed the decoding vulnerability CVE-2021-30860 in iOS 14.8, before Lockdown Mode was introduced. [4] After the code ran and escaped the sandbox, the mechanism that gave it the privileges needed to install Pegasus remains unknown. [5]
After installation. The operator can tell Pegasus to collect accessible messages or photos from the phone and send them back. In its separate Project Torogozinvestigation, Citizen Lab found evidence of transfers on some infected devices. [6] · [7]
2023 · Lockdown Mode blocked BLASTPASS
Citizen Lab found Pegasus on an iPhone running iOS 16.6, which was up to date at the time. A malicious image embedded in an attachment for the Wallet app arrived through iMessage. Two vulnerabilities let the attack run without the target doing anything.
Apple’s security team confirmed to Citizen Lab that Lockdown Mode blocked this specific chain. This is a documented case in which turning it on in advance made a difference. [8]
Trident and BLASTPASS based on Citizen Lab [2] [8]. The FORCEDENTRY row is adapted from Google TAG, Buying Spying, p. 37 [5].
Did Pegasus also steal Face ID or Touch ID data?
To recognise a face or fingerprint, the iPhone compares the sensor reading with a mathematical template stored on the device. Apple says that the template is encrypted with a key available only to the Secure Enclave and excluded from iCloud backups. [9] · [10]
An app requesting a biometric check receives the result: success or failure. A photo of your face copied from the photo library can expose your identity without revealing the template used to unlock your iPhone. [11]
A malicious message or web page can also compromise an iPhone
Operation Triangulation · A message triggered the attack
Operation Triangulation was a separate spyware campaign. Kaspersky’s 2023 investigation did not establish a link to Pegasus. Processing a font in an iMessage attachment triggered the attack. Later stages gave the spyware greater privileges. [12]
DarkSword · The browser had to load a malicious page
In March 2026, Google Threat Intelligence described a chain of six vulnerabilities targeting iOS 18.4 through 18.7. One campaign impersonated Snapchat. Others used compromised sites. All relied on the browser loading a page.
The code could escape Safari’s isolated process and gain privileges. Google says all six vulnerabilities were fixed in iOS 26.3. It recommends installing the latest available version or, if you cannot update, enabling Lockdown Mode on supported devices. [13]
In Safari on iPhone, a compatible content blocker can prevent resources that match its rules from loading. A malicious page that escapes those rules can still reach the browser. Filtering does not patch an iOS vulnerability. [14]
Screen lock, iCloud and browser extensions protect different things
In 2020, Google Project Zero demonstrated a short-range wireless attack against a powered-on, locked iPhone that had been unlocked at least once since startup. A sleeping phone continues to communicate. The passcode strengthens encryption of the device’s data while allowing the services that receive messages to keep running. [15] · [16]
After a long period without unlocking. Since iOS 18.1, an iPhone can automatically restart and return to its state before the first unlock. Some keys are then cleared from memory, reducing the data accessible on a phone that has stayed locked. This feature is off by default on supervised devices, so IT teams should check their policy. [17]
If someone sees your passcode and then steals your iPhone
Before a theft occurs, turn on Stolen Device Protection in Settings → Face ID & Passcode (or Touch ID & Passcode). Away from familiar locations, some actions require biometrics with no passcode fallback. Changing the Apple Account password can also require a one-hour wait and a second biometric check. The “Always” option extends these requirements to familiar locations. [18]
On my own devices, I also turned off AirPlay and Handoff and encrypted my Time Machine backups.
Your account and its backups. Advanced Data Protection extends end-to-end encryption to iCloud Backup, Photos, Notes and iCloud Drive. Mail, Contacts and Calendar retain a different level of protection. Recovery then relies on trusted devices, a recovery contact or a recovery key. A compromised phone can still read the data its current session can access. [19] To protect sign-in to the account, see security keys for Apple Account.
Filtering personal browsing and detecting threats on work computers
My experience on computers. For personal browsing, I used uBlock Origin or Browser Guard when I wanted stronger filtering.
uBlock Origin applies lists of rules to block certain requests, including those from ads and trackers. Malwarebytes Browser Guard can also block known phishing sites. A new fraudulent site can still get through. [20] [21]
On a work computer, EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) helps the security team detect, investigate and respond to suspicious activity. [22]
A browser sandbox limits what a web page can do on the device. Web filtering cannot intercept a zero-click attack that begins in iMessage.
On Mac, turning off AirPlay and Handoff limits nearby connections
In 2025, Oligo demonstrated zero-click code execution on vulnerable Macs where AirPlay Receiver was enabled and open to other devices on the same network or to everyone. The attacker was on that network. Turning off AirPlay Receiver when it is unnecessary removes that entry point. Macs that send or receive content still need updates. [23]
Handoff lets you pick up an activity on a nearby device signed in to the same Apple Account. It also enables Universal Clipboard. With Wi-Fi and Bluetooth on, text copied on the iPhone can briefly appear in the clipboard of a nearby Mac. If either device is left unlocked, someone with access to it could paste the text. Turn off Handoff when you do not need this sharing. [24]
For technical readers · Check FileVault and Time Machine separately
On a Mac with Apple silicon or a T2 chip, the internal drive is encrypted in hardware. FileVault ties protection of the volume key to the user’s credentials and the hardware. The Time Machine drive has its own encryption setting. To test it, restore a sample file and open it, and keep the means of unlocking the backup off the Mac. [25] · [26]
Coruna stopped when it detected Lockdown Mode
The Coruna exploit kit targeted iOS 13.0 through 17.2.1 via the web. Google found comments in its code consistent with the use of AI. Those comments do not establish that AI discovered the vulnerabilities.
One Coruna component stopped if Lockdown Mode was on or the visitor used private browsing. This was specific to the kit studied. If you are at risk of being targeted, prioritise updating iOS and enabling Lockdown Mode before an attack. [27]
If Apple warns that you have been targeted
On a trusted device, type account.apple.com yourself and look for the alert at the top of the account page. A genuine Apple notification never asks you to open a file, install a profile or share a code.
A notification means you were targeted. To establish whether the attack succeeded, contact your security team from a trusted device. Ask what evidence to preserve before wiping the iPhone. [28]
Apple also directs people who receive an alert to the Access Now Digital Security Helpline. It offers free technical assistance to journalists, human rights defenders and others in civil society. [29]
Sources and references
- Apple — Lockdown Mode ↩
- Citizen Lab and Lookout — analysis of Trident ↩
- Citizen Lab — evidence found on the device ↩
- Google Project Zero — analysis of the decoder ↩
- Google Threat Analysis Group, Buying Spying — see pages 36–37 (diagram on the right) ↩
- Amnesty Security Lab — data collection capabilities ↩
- Citizen Lab — evidence of transfers ↩
- Citizen Lab — discovery of BLASTPASS and scope of Lockdown Mode ↩
- Apple — Face ID ↩
- Apple — Touch ID ↩
- Apple — what an app can access ↩
- Kaspersky — technical reconstruction of Operation Triangulation ↩
- Google Threat Intelligence — DarkSword campaigns, affected versions and fixes ↩
- Apple — content blockers for Safari on iPhone ↩
- Google Project Zero — demonstration and prerequisites ↩
- Apple — how the passcode protects data ↩
- Apple — automatic restart after a period without unlocking ↩
- Apple — Stolen Device Protection ↩
- Apple — iCloud data categories ↩
- uBlock Origin — how filter lists work ↩
- Malwarebytes — Browser Guard protections ↩
- ANSSI — the role of EDR in security monitoring ↩
- Oligo — AirBorne test conditions ↩
- Apple — Universal Clipboard requirements ↩
- Apple — FileVault ↩
- Apple — Time Machine backups ↩
- Google Threat Intelligence — Coruna analysis ↩
- Apple — verify a notification and get help ↩
- Access Now — digital security support for civil society ↩